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is both essential to some important kinds of human relationships and that 
it presupposes libertarian free agency. Unlike Kane, however, he is skepti-
cal that those kinds of relationships are possible. He argues that much of 
their importance can be retained even if they are not possible via similar 
relationships that presuppose “a notion of demand that does not require 
the ability to do otherwise and a sensitivity to which does not require the 
reactive attitudes” (168). The notion he identifies is the demand of axio-
logical recommendation (e.g., “You ought to stop abusing me or it will de-
stroy our relationship”). In contrast with the demand of moral obligation, 
which Nelkin’s account of personal relationships requires, the demand of 
axiological recommendation is consistent with the agent who is the target 
of the demand not being able to do otherwise. A failure to meet this sort 
of demand does not—or should not—engender reactive attitudes. For this 
reason, the kinds of personal relationships Pereboom gives an account of 
seem less valuable and important than the ones discussed by Nelkin and 
Kane. Pereboom admits that we would lose something if he is right about 
the nature of personal relationships, but he argues that the loss is not very 
significant. A disavowal of reactive attitudes in our personal relationships 
would not preclude having personal but non-reactive attitudes, like disap-
pointment, sadness, and hurt feelings. And relationships characterized by 
susceptibility to those non-reactive attitudes are especially valuable, and, 
according to Pereboom, they are valuable enough.
While the collection is limited in scope insofar as it targets only one vari-
ety of libertarianism, the authors discuss a sufficiently wide range of topics 
and perspectives that the volume would be a valuable addition to a gradu-
ate seminar on free will. Moreover, as one of the only volumes devoted to 
libertarianism, it makes for an efficient but thorough introduction to the 
contemporary debate surrounding libertarianism.1 
1Thanks to Chris Tweedt and Brandon Warmke for comments on an earlier draft of this 
review.
Free Will in Philosophical Theology, by Kevin Timpe. New York and London: 
Bloomsbury, 2014. 177 pages. $120.00 (hardcover).
JOSEF QUITTERER, University of Innsbruck
Free will is essential for Christian faith. Without free will, there would be 
no sin, no guilt, and no moral responsibility. The Christian doctrine of sal-
vation through divine forgiveness and through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ 
would be meaningless without free will. On the other hand, the Christian 




theological tradition places strict limitations on free will: human decisions 
are shaped by the influence of original sin, human beings are unable to 
perform good actions without divine grace, and there is a notorious ten-
sion between divine providence and human freedom.
In Free Will in Philosophical Theology, Kevin Timpe aims to give a philo-
sophically coherent defense of central Christian doctrines concerning the 
free will issue. To avoid the notorious problems surrounding the diversity 
and complexity of theological approaches, he takes the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church as his theological point of departure. There are different 
methods of defending the Christian doctrine. Instead of developing argu-
ments justifying specific Christian beliefs, Timpe chooses to clarify them. 
He provides this clarification through “philosophical theology,” an appli-
cation of the techniques of philosophical analysis to the central doctrines 
of Christian faith. Explaining central elements of Christian doctrine with 
the help of specific approaches in analytic philosophy’s free will debate 
can be a way to argue for the rationality of these doctrines.
Timpe’s philosophical point of departure for this enterprise is his own 
“sourcehood incompatibilism”—an approach in the philosophy of free 
will which focuses on the agent’s being the ultimate source of her actions 
rather than on her having alternative possibilities. In particular, the view 
that Timpe applies to Christian doctrine, is a version of sourcehood incom-
patibilism, namely virtue libertarianism. On this view, the agent is free if 
her acts are based on her character or habits (for which she is responsible), 
even if at the time of the decision she might not have a choice between 
alternate possibilities. Aristotle presents a similar view in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, where he argues that human acts derive quasi-naturally from the 
agent’s habit. Timpe applies virtue libertarianism to the aspects of Chris-
tian doctrine where freedom of the will is at stake. In elaborating his argu-
ments, Timpe follows the classical exitus-reditus model: he starts with the 
state of humans (and angels) before the fall, then he discusses the prob-
lems for free will posed by original sin and grace, and finally he deals with 
the challenges to human freedom posed by the states of damnation and 
redemption. At the end of his book, Timpe discusses the freedom of God 
and the relationship between divine and human freedom.
Timpe successfully manages to subsume the classical connection be-
tween the will and the perceived good under the reasons-constraint of 
free choice (chapter 2). The assumption in the free will debate that every 
choice of an action depends on specific reasons corresponds to the clas-
sical assumption that “the agent chooses to act for the sake of some end 
which she perceives to be good in some way” (20). Virtue libertarianism 
makes this reasons-constraint on free choice even stronger: one’s habit or 
moral character “influences what one does see as a reason, the ordering of 
reasons, the causal efficacy of the reasons” (26).
Even if virtue libertarianism is a useful tool for adequately analyzing 
human free will after the fall, its explanatory power is weaker when it 
comes to human beings’ prelapsarian state. According to Thomas Aquinas 
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(Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 95, a 3), pre-fall humans possess every virtue. How 
can agents—with a morally perfect habit or character—turn away from the 
supreme object of love and decide to sin? Libertarians could reconstruct 
original sin as a decision based on genuinely open alternative possibilities 
in the moment just before the fall. Virtue libertarians, however, have the 
problem that the morally bad actions of pre-fall-agents cannot stem from 
a morally corrupted character.
A way out of this problem would be to shift the first bad decision from 
human to purely spiritual agents (angels), who then exerted a negative 
influence on human decision-making. In fact, Timpe analyzes original sin 
exclusively in the case of the fallen angel(s). However, even in this case 
an explanatory gap remains—how is it that a morally and intellectually 
perfect being decided to defect from the highest good? After comparing 
intellectualist and voluntarist approaches to this problem, Timpe seems to 
share the conclusion that Katherin Rogers ascribes to Anselm, according 
to which the primal sin remains something “inexplicable and ultimately 
mysterious” (47). He admits that a “Christian account of primal sin cannot 
avoid all arbitrariness” (48).
A notorious difficulty for human freedom faced by Christian doctrine 
is the relationship between original sin, free will, and grace. How can the 
virtue-libertarian approach cast light on this complex issue? According to 
Christian doctrine, original sin shapes the character of every human being so 
to dispose her to act against the divine order. Against Pelagius, the Council 
of Ephesus maintained that the individual cannot willingly cause his or her 
own salvation. Humans cannot even willingly choose to accept God’s grace. 
In the light of this, the question arises how a virtue-libertarian account 
can be maintained. Factors beyond the control of a person’s free will, like 
original sin and grace, seem to determine all of the human actions that are 
relevant for salvation. Virtues could have a positive influence on our being 
in a state of grace, yet we are not free to develop them ourselves. Timpe 
tries to avoid this theological determinism. According to him, the fact that 
we have no direct causal influence on our salvation does not imply that the 
receipt of divine grace is not up to us. Even if we cannot directly control our 
being saved by divine grace, we can indirectly enable salvation by ceasing 
to resist that grace. There is no active role for free will in this enterprise; the 
libertarian aspect manifests itself in the quiescent abstinence from willing 
(61). Here, however, it is hard to avoid the question why refraining from 
willing should not itself be an act of (free) will. Moreover, departing from 
a virtue-libertarian approach, why shouldn’t we assume that an individual 
can willingly choose to develop a habit or virtue consisting in not manifest-
ing the power of our (natural) will to reject God’s grace?
In Timpe’s book, virtue libertarianism unfolds its full explanatory pow-
ers in discussing the question of free will after death. In chapters 5 and 6, 
Timpe deals mainly with the two optional eschatological states, which have 
a definitive and irreversible character: eternal damnation and salvation. 
According to Christian doctrine, both states are permanent; this means it 
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is not possible for the eternally damned to attain salvation or for the re-
deemed to become unredeemed. Yet human persons retain their freedom 
in both states. To deny free will in these eschatological states would amount 
to rejecting the claim that free will is part of human nature. However, is it 
possible to reconcile freedom of the will with the requirement that these 
two states be permanent? According to Timpe, the source-incompatibilist 
approach of virtue libertarianism offers a solution to this problem. In ac-
cordance with the Catechism of the Catholic Church, he maintains that the 
impossibility of escaping hell is not a consequence of divine punishment 
but rather of individuals’ free choice. The idea is that they have formed 
their moral character in such a way that it is psychologically impossible 
for them to choose to leave hell and they simply see no reason to improve 
their moral character. In a similar fashion, the redeemed have formed their 
character in such way that they are now unable to choose sin. Timpe even 
integrates purgatory into this virtue-libertarian conception of eschatologi-
cal states. Purgatory is the last step in this process of character formation, 
which completely erases a person’s ability to sin, yet does so without an-
nihilating her free will.
In the last chapter of his book, Timpe uses the virtue-libertarian model 
to resolve the “conflict between God’s freedom and His essential good-
ness” (104). God’s character is essentially morally perfect; therefore, he 
is unable to act in a morally imperfect way. His perfect moral nature im-
plies that he is unable to make bad choices. Timpe admits that specific 
actions—e.g., the creation of the best of all possible worlds—necessarily 
follow from God’s nature; but the kind of necessity at issue, according 
to Timpe, does not contradict God’s freedom, since it comes “from God’s 
own nature and not from anything outside Himself” (116). This argument 
against compatibilism, however, raises the suspicion that, for Timpe, free-
dom is here equivalent with authorship: An agent acts freely if she (and 
not something external) is the author of her actions. Obviously, authorship 
is a necessary condition of free agency, but as Timpe himself indicates at 
the end of chapter 7, it might not be sufficient.
Free Will in Philosophical Theology provides a comprehensive and sys-
tematic philosophical reconstruction of central elements of Christian belief 
concerning the free-will issue. Timpe successfully relates purely theologi-
cal topics like the fall, original sin, grace, and redemption to the techni-
cal philosophical debates. Virtue libertarianism seems a promising tool 
for handling the ambivalences of the Christian concept of free will. The 
application of the virtue-libertarian approach to a Christian understand-
ing of human and divine agency contributes to solving certain theological 
problems like that of the compatibility of human freedom with grace and 
original sin. Yet it elaborates the limits of a philosophical clarification of 
some religious assumptions, such as the original sin of morally perfect 
agents and the freedom of God. I recommend this book especially to theo-
logians seeking a bridge between their area of specialization and the free 
will debate in analytic philosophy.
